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ABSTRACT
Using census data, Costa and Kahn (QJE, 2000) find that power couples - couples in which both
spouses have college degrees - are increasingly likely to be located in the largest metropolitan areas.
One explanation for this trend is that college educated couples are more likely to face a co-location
problem - the desire to satisfy the career aspirations of both spouses - and therefore are more
attracted to large labor markets than are other couples. An alternative explanation is that all college
educated individuals, married and unmarried, are attracted to the amenities and high returns to
education found in large cities and that as a result, the formation of power couples through marriage
of  educated  singles  and  additional  education  is  more  likely  to  occur  in  larger  than  smaller
metropolitan areas. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we analyze the dynamic
patterns of migration, marriage, divorce and education in relation to city size and find that power
couples are not more likely to migrate to the largest cities than part-power couples or power singles.
Instead, the location trends are better explained by the higher rate of power couple formation in
larger metropolitan areas. Regression analysis suggests that it is only the education of the husband
and not the joint education profile of the couple that affects the propensity to migrate to large
metropolitan areas.
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Couples in which both husband and wife have college degrees are increasingly likely to be located in 
large metropolitan areas.  In 1970, 39% of these couples – called “power couples” by Costa and Kahn (2000) 
- lived in metropolitan areas of at least two million.  In 1990, this number had jumped to 50%.  By 
comparison, among couples in which only one spouse has a college education - “part-power couples” - the 
proportion living in large metropolitan areas increased more slowly, growing from 36% to 42% over the two 
decades. Couples in which neither spouse has a college degree  - “low-power couples” - have the lowest 
probability of living in a large city and the lowest rate of increase, growing from 30% to 34% in twenty 
years. (Costa and Kahn, 2000) 
Costa and Kahn consider two main explanations for the increasing concentration of power couples in 
large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). First, large metropolitan areas may be increasingly attractive to 
the college educated, regardless of their marital status. The increase in urbanization of the college educated 
may reflect higher returns to education in larger MSAs or urban amenities more commonly found there.  
Thus, the observed trends may be the result of college educated singles moving to large urban areas and then 
marrying.  Second, the labor markets found in large metropolitan areas may hold particular attraction for 
power couples. All married couples potentially face the possibility that their location preferences will differ.   
This ‘co-location problem’ may arise from different preferences for amenities or proximity to family, but 
economists emphasize job opportunities.  If husband and wife work in the paid labor market and if they live 
together, then they must both find acceptable employment in the same location.  With the rise in married 
women’s labor force participation, the potential for co-location conflict has increased for all couples, but may 
be most acute for the college educated because they tend to have more specialized careers. Solving this type 
of co-location problem may be easier in the labor markets of large metropolitan areas, and thus these areas 
should be magnets for power couples.     
Costa and Kahn conclude that the ability of large MSAs to solve the co-location problem explains most 
of the observed increase in the concentration of power couples in large MSAs. Although the data used in   4
their analysis are cross-sectional, they suggest that the migration of power couples is the principal 
mechanism underlying the changes in observed location patterns.  
In this paper we investigate the relationship between migration and the education profiles of couples.   
We ask two questions.  First, is there evidence that the co-location pressure faced by highly educated couples 
is a determinant of migration?  That is, compared to other couples, are power couples more likely to migrate 
into, and less likely to leave, large MSAs?  Second, do the migration patterns of power couples differ from 
those of other couples?  Positive responses to these questions would support Costa and Kahn’s co-location 
explanation for the concentration of power couples in large urban areas.  We do not, however, find evidence 
supporting the co-location explanation. 
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we find that, holding all else equal, 
power couples are more likely to migrate and, when they migrate, are more likely to migrate to large urban 
areas than low-power couples.  We find, however, that the factor determining couples’ migration is not their 
joint education profile but the husband’s education.  More specifically, we find that the migration behavior of 
part-power couples in which only the husband is a college graduate is indistinguishable from that of power 
couples, while the migration behavior of part-power couples in which only the wife is a college graduate is 
indistinguishable from that of low-power couples.  Our conclusion that migration is affected by the 
husband’s education rather than the couple’s joint education profile is unaltered when we include controls for 
post-graduate education and occupation to identify those couples most likely to have specialized careers.   
Logic suggests that the observed location of power couples must be the resultant of four dynamic 
processes:  migration, marriage, divorce, and human capital accumulation.  Looking at the stock of power 
couples living in large metropolitan areas, we can conclude only that each spouse must have earned a college 
degree, married a spouse who earns/earned a college degree, remained married, and migrated to and/or 
chosen to remain in a large metropolitan area.      
We argue that the migration of power couples into large urban areas is unlikely to be the primary 
mechanism behind the concentration of power couples in large MSAs.  The formation of power couples in 
large MSAs provides a more plausible explanation.  Although the differences between groups are not   5
precisely estimated, the patterns suggest that differences in the migration rates of power singles, in 
assortative mating patterns, and in college enrollment rates by city size  may be responsible for the increasing 
concentration of power couples in large MSAs.  This suggestion is strengthened by the 2000 census data, 
data unavailable to Costa and Kahn.  Between 1990 and 2000 the proportion of power couples living in large 
MSAs fell, while the proportion of low-power couples in large MSAs increased.  This reversal of the earlier 
trend is difficult to explain in terms of power couple migration and co-location pressure.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on couple migration.  
In section 3 we describe the data, the econometric model, and the variables we use to investigate the 
relationship between the joint education profile of spouses and the probability of migration.  Regression 
results are presented in section 4.  Section 5 provides an overview of couple migration patterns as well as the 
other mechanisms that may explain the location trends – migration of singles, assortative mating, marriage 
and divorce trends, and educational attainment by city size.  Section 6 reports on changes in power couple 
concentration in large urban areas using data from the 2000 census.  Section 7 concludes.     
 
2.  Migration of Couples 
Economists frame individuals’ migration behavior as human capital decisions (Mincer, 1978: 
Sjaastad 1962).  A person will migrate if the expected benefit of living in another location less migration 
costs exceeds the expected benefit of remaining in the current location.  The main statistical trends of 
migration are consistent with this model - younger individuals are more mobile than older individuals, more 
educated persons are more mobile than those with less education, rural to urban migration is more common 
than the reverse, and the longer individuals have resided in an area the less likely they are to migrate.  (For a 
review of the migration literature, see Greenwood, 1997). 
  
Polachek and Horvath (1977), Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978) were among the first to frame the 
migration decision explicitly in terms of family net gain rather than individual net gain.  These researchers 
abstract from decision making within the family and assume that families migrate if and only if the sum of 
the benefits of migrating is greater than the sum of the costs, where the sums are taken over all family   6
members.  Family migration is less likely than individual migration since the costs of migrating increase with 
the number of family members while the benefits may not.  The model suggests that one spouse, typically the 
husband, is often a ‘tied-stayer’ while the wife is often a ‘tied-mover’.  Tied-stayers forgo moves that would 
result in positive net returns for the individual, but negative net returns for the family.  Tied-movers 
participate in moves that result in a loss for themselves but positive net returns for the family.   
Empirical work confirms the importance of husbands’ career opportunities in migration decisions.  
Using a sample of college graduates, Duncan and Perrucci (1976) show that the higher the occupational 
prestige and migration opportunities connected to the husband’s occupation, the greater the probability that 
the couple will migrate.  They find, however, that the occupational prestige and migration opportunities of 
the wife’s career did not affect migration probabilities.  Using data also from the 1970s, Bielby and Bielby 
(1992) link the migration behavior of couples to gender-role beliefs.  Couples who subscribe to a more 
traditional “provider role” for husbands will not be deterred from moves that harm the wife’s employment 
opportunities but will be deterred from moves that harm the husband’s career opportunities.  More recent 
studies continue to find similar gendered determinants of couple migration (Gardner et al. 2001; Nivalainen 
2004).    
Unlike these large-scale statistical studies, Green (1997) uses a case-study approach to investigate 
the migration/location decisions of dual-career households.  On the basis of interviews with thirty such 
couples, she finds that the leader in migration decisions is most often the spouse with (a) the more highly 
paid career; (b) the more locationally constrained career; and/or (c) the more insecure career.  In the large 
majority of cases, the spouse with these job characteristics was the husband. Green notes that although the 
respondents appreciate the greater career opportunities in large urban centers, many are unwilling to incur the 
costs associated with such large areas – high costs of living, congestion, etc. (Green, 1997).   
Because career choice is endogenous to beliefs about migration and marriage, Frank (1978) argues 
that expectations of migration based on the maximization of net family welfare help explain the male-female 
wage gap. Women are less likely to invest in their own human capital when their opportunity set is limited 
by their husbands’ locational choices.  Similarly, if employers believe that the location decisions of women   7
are determined largely by their husbands’ careers and not their own, employers may be less likely to invest in 
firm-specific human capital for women.  As a result, women may tend to enter more mobile careers – careers 
that build largely on general, rather than specific human capital and careers in which opportunities are not 
concentrated in large urban areas.  Studies of couple migration by Shihadeh (1991), Morrison and Lichter 
(1988), Spitze (1984), Bird and Bird (1985), Cooke and Bailey (1996), and Jacobsen and Levin (1997) are 
broadly consistent with Frank’s argument.  
Robst and McGoldrick (1996) investigate the impact of destination size on outcomes for tied movers.  
They began by hypothesizing that while a trailing spouse has a job search limited to the location that the 
leading spouse has chosen, if the location is a large MSA and this in turn reflects higher job vacancies, then 
the trailing spouse may find a wage offer near the maximum that could be obtained in a nationwide search.  
This hypothesis was not supported by the data.  The authors found that the size of the local labor market had 
no significant effect on the likelihood of women being “overeducated”, i.e., having a higher level of 
education than the average within their occupation.  They suggested that it is not the market’s size that is 
important, but its job composition:  a small local labor market with a relatively large concentration of white-
collar employment is as beneficial to women as a large labor market without such a concentration. 
 
3.  Econometric Model and Data Description 
  Our econometric analysis addresses the following question:  compared to part-power and low-power 
couples, are power couples more likely to migrate to and less likely to migrate from large cities?  To answer 
this question, we consider the determinants of couple migration, focusing on couples’ joint education 
profiles.   
    
3.1  Data  
The regression analyses presented in the following sections use data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID is a longitudinal survey of a representative sample of American individuals and   8
families.  The original sample included members of 4800 families.  All individuals from the original families 
are followed as they move or form new family units.  For this study we have included all married couples 
who live together and all unmarried heterosexual couples who have lived together for at least one year.
1  In 
all that follows, we define ‘power couples’ as those in which both husband and wife have a bachelor’s 
degree; ‘part-power couples’ as those in which only one spouse holds a bachelor’s degree; and ‘low-power 
couples’ as those in which neither spouse holds a bachelor’s degree.
2  When we refer to an individual as 
“college educated” we mean that he or she holds a bachelor’s degree.  The sample is limited to men aged 25-
39 and women aged 23-37.  This restriction allows us to focus on those individuals and couples whose 
migration decisions would be most influenced by career considerations.
3   
The Geocode Match Supplement to the PSID provides detailed geographic identifiers necessary for a 
migration study.  Building up from the county of residence, we sort observations into Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs).  The U.S. Census Bureau defines MSAs as agglomerations of counties that include a large 
population nucleus and adjacent communities that share a high degree of social and economic integration.  
We define migration as a move between MSAs, between an MSA and a non-MSA county, or between two 
non-MSA counties.  Thus, moves within an MSA are not treated as migration.  The changing definition of 
MSAs poses a problem for migration analysis.  For example, according to the 1990 MSA definitions, 
Baltimore MD and Washington DC were distinct MSAs, but according to the 2000 definitions they are part 
of a single MSA.  To prevent changing MSA definitions from creating the appearance of changes in 
                                                 
1 Dropping couples who were not legally married did not alter the results in preliminary analyses.  
2 Some imputation was required for the education variable.  Education was asked of respondents when they entered the 
household but not at each subsequent round.   In 1985, the education questions were re-asked of all individuals in the 
sample.   Since year of graduation was asked, it was possible to work backwards from 1985 to code the education 
attainment for previous years.  For years after 1985, only new heads/spouses were asked the education questions.  For 
those already in the sample, if they were enrolled in school in 1985, they were assumed to have finished their program 
and so a degree was imputed to them in following years.  If individuals were not enrolled in school in 1985, their 
education level observed in 1985 was simply carried forward.  The resulting imputations look reasonable in comparison 
to average education of the individual’s occupation.   A robustness test was performed in which education was raised to 
be at least the minimum level of education that individuals who reported the same occupation deemed necessary to 
perform the job.  The results are not substantially different.   
3 These age categories are the focus of Costa and Kahn (2000).  Similar trends in location are found with expanded age 
categories.   9
migration rates, we apply the 1990 MSA definitions consistently throughout the sample.
4  In the analyses that 
follow, we define “large” metropolitan areas as MSAs with populations greater than two million, “midsize” 
metropolitan areas as MSAs with populations between 250,000 and two million, and “small” metropolitan 
areas as non-metropolitan areas and MSAs with populations less than 250,000.  We choose these categories 
to be consistent with those used by Costa and Kahn.  Appendix A lists the large MSAs for the 1970-2000 
period.   
In our regression analyses we use data for the period 1980-1993. We limit our analysis to these years 
because some of the relevant variables–most importantly, the education variables—were not available for 
any longer period.  Since it is during this period that we observe the greatest increase in power couple 
concentration in large MSAs, we would expect the co-location effect to be strongest during this period.  The 
panel data are pooled into twelve two-year cross-sections.  For each couple-year observation, the dependent 
variable captures the migration behavior observed in year two and all independent variables measured in year 
one.  Our sample includes 21955 couple-year observations with 638 observed migrations (3%).     
 
3.2  Econometric Model 
We estimate two econometric models of migration.  In the first we estimate the probability of 
migrating without regard to the destination.  The dependent variable is binary, indicating whether or not the 
couple migrates.  In the second model we distinguish migrants by the size of destination.  Here, the couple 
chooses among four alternatives:  staying in the current location, migrating to a small MSA, migrating to a 
midsize MSA, and migrating to a large MSA.  The decision to migrate and the size of destination are 




                                                 
4 Costa and Kahn, whose focus is not dynamic, use the current year MSA definition for each census year that they 
consider but they note that their results do not change substantially under alternative (stable) definitions.    10
3.2.1  Sample Selection Issues 
Two selection issues require attention. The first is attrition: the requirement that migration variables 
be defined in year two results in the loss of observations.  The second is change in marital status: because our 
observations are at the household level – unmarried individual heads of households and married couples – 
and are defined over a two-year period, the marital status must be constant over the two years.  Hence, the 
location in year two is defined only for those couples that remain married.  As a result, our samples are 
doubly selected to include only those observations that (i) have not been lost to attrition and (ii) have the 
same marital status in year two as in year one.
   Beginning with a sample of 26324 couple-year observations, 
we lose 2264 observations to attrition and 1354 observations to divorce. We dropped 751 additional 
observations due to missing values for key variables or death.     
The model for the binary choice decision is a three-equation latent dependent variable model where 
equation (1) estimates the probability of remaining in the sample in year two (i.e., no attrition), equation (2) 
estimates the probability of remaining married in year two, and equation (3) is the equation of interest, 























N N N i











* *, i i z q and 
*
i y are unobserved latent variables;  i i W V ,  and  i X are K, J and M row vectors of exogenous 
explanatory variables; and  γ δ, and β are K, J and M column vectors of parameters to be estimated.  The full 
sample is denoted N1; N2 includes all couples who are present in both years; and N3 includes all couples who 
remain married in year two.  We assume all three disturbance terms are drawn from normal distributions.  In 
the absence of selection bias, we assume  i i ω υ , and  i u are identically and independently normally distributed 
zero mean error terms.    
  Following Vella (1998, 1992, 1993) and Eklof and Karlsson (1999) we test for sample selection in 
the binary choice model.  Rewrite equation (1) as:   11
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where  1 λ and  2 λ are equal to 
2
u u σ σ ω  and 
2
u u σ σ υ respectively.  The term  i η  is a white noise error term.  
Replacing  i ω and  i υ with the estimated generalized residuals from the probit models – which by Vella 
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Under the null hypothesis,  1 λ and  2 λ are equal to zero and  i η  is equal to  1 u .    The t-tests on  1 λ and  2 λ are 
tests of selection bias since under the null hypothesis the estimates are consistent.  In general, however, under 
the alternative hypothesis, the estimates are not consistent.   
  The test results are presented in table 1.  Shown are some key variables as well as the test statistics.
5   
Column A presents the binary choice probit regression (equation (1)) without adjusting for sample selection.  
Column B presents the results from equation (5), including the two test statistics.  As indicated by the t-tests, 
neither  1 λ nor  2 λ  are significant.  In the regressions presented in columns C and D we alter the modeling of 
sample selection.  In column C the two selection criteria are combined.   In this model the first step equation 
estimates the probability of being observed in year two (i.e., no divorce and no attrition).  In column D the 
observations that have been lost due to attrition are simply dropped and we model only the sample selection 
arising from divorce.
6  In both variations, the t-test indicates insignificant test variables.    
                                                 
5 Full regression results for table 1 are presented in appendices C(i) and C(ii). 
6 More formally, in column C we present a variation of equation (5): 
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i z estimates the probability that individual i is observed and married in year two.  Likewise, in column D we 
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  Column E estimates the abridged model of column D under a maximum likelihood probit estimation 
procedure outlined by van de Ven and van Praag (1981) and implemented through STATA using the 
HECKPROB command.
7  The estimates in this model are consistent and asymptotically efficient even in the 
presence of selection bias as it allows for the estimation of the correlation between the error terms  i ω and  i u .  
The likelihood ratio test of independent equations – testing the null hypothesis that ρ=0 – indicates again that 
sample selection bias is not a concern.   
  Overall, the t-tests on the inverse Mills ratios added to the regressions in columns B through D and 
the likelihood ratio test in column E indicate that sample selection bias is not significant in this model.   In 
the analyses that follow, we present the binary choice estimation results from the maximum likelihood probit 
model.    
  For the second model, in which size of the destination is determined jointly with the decision to 
migrate, we rely on the above test results and estimate the model under the assumption that sample selection 
bias is not significant. Here we employ a multinomial logistic specification and estimate the following model 
using a maximum likelihood procedure.
8   Extending the binary model from (4), the probability that 

















































                                                                                                                                                                  
where observations lost to attrition are dropped from the sample and 
*
i z estimates the probability that individual i is 
married in year two.   
 
7 Maximum likelihood estimates in which the missing observations are dropped and selection is solely due to marital 
stability are similar.   
8 Although we assumed a normal distribution in the first case, we assume a logistic error distribution here.  As we have 
no a priori beliefs concerning the distribution of the errors, the choice of error form was determined solely by ease of 
computation.  While it would have been more consistent to estimate multinomial probit regressions, convergence was 
difficult.  The binary choice regressions were run under the assumption of logistic errors and the results were very 
similar.     13
Where j=1,2,3,4 denotes the four categorical outcomes (not migrating, migrating to a small MSA, migrating 
to a mid-size MSA, migrating to a large MSA); the base outcome (j=1) is the choice of not migrating.  In the 
results that follow, we present the relative risk ratios, which are equal to the exponentiated value of a 
coefficient.  This allows for an easy interpretation:  the relative risk ratio indicates the change in the 
probability of observing outcome k, relative to the probability of not migrating, for a one unit change in the 
corresponding variable.   
 
3.2.2 Endogeneity 
Migration and education are endogenous if individuals have unobservable characteristics that are 
reflected in a higher propensity to invest in human capital through both education and migration.  To correct 
for unobserved heterogeneity in the propensity to invest in human capital, we control for whether the current 
state is the home state of either spouse and whether or not the household head (read: husband) has previously 
moved in order to take a job.  The inclusion of these variables weakens the endogeneity concerns as they 
capture some of the otherwise unobservable propensity to invest in human capital.  Indeed with the inclusion 
of these variables, Hausman tests allow us to reject the null hypothesis of endogeneity at the 5% confidence 
level.  Column F in table 1 highlights the importance of these variables.  While the results are robust to 
inclusions and omissions of other control variables, the omission of these variables significantly alters the 
impact of the education variables.   
 
3.2.3  Control Variables   
In the following discussion, we focus on couples’ joint education profile as a determinant of 
migration, controlling for other factors such as family, location amenities, employment, and occupation.  
Appendix B shows means and standard deviations for the full sample, which includes all couple-year 
observations, and separately for the migrant observations. The means show the strong importance of the 
couples’ home state and previous migration behavior.  Close to 80% of the couple observations are residing 
in the home state of at least one spouse.  Compare this with only 45% of migrant observations.  In 26% of all   14
observations, the head had moved previously for a job; the corresponding figure for migrant observations is 
38%. In our sample, migrants are younger, slightly less likely to have pre-school children, less likely to be 
home owners, and less likely to be non-white.  Migrants’ origins tend to be characterized by slower growth, 
higher housing value, and greater distance to any large MSAs.  In terms of labor force attachment, migrants 
have lower job durations and are more likely to be unemployed or out of the labor force.   
 
4. Regression  Results 
The regression analysis provides no evidence that co-location pressure is a determinant of migration.  
Tables 2-5 provide key regression results.
9  For the binary model, the marginal effects of the key variables 
are presented – the change in the probability of migrating due to a change in the dummy variable from zero 
to one.   For the multinomial model, the results are presented as relative risk ratios.  For a dummy variable, 
this is the change in the probability of migrating to the indicated destination size over the probability of not 
migrating that occurs due to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1.      
 
4.1  The Effect of Power Couple Status on Migration   
Table 2 presents the results for key variables in the binary model.  Column A corresponds to column 
E in table 1 and controls for sample selection using maximum likelihood estimation.  The regression results 
show that it is not the joint education profile of a couple but only the husband’s education that affects the 
decision to migrate.   
The analysis hinges on the behavior of couples in which one spouse has a college degree and the 
other does not (i.e., the part-power couples).  In column A, we pool the part-power couples in which the 
husband is a college graduate with the part-power couples in which the wife is a college graduate.  Point 
estimates indicate that power couples are more likely to migrate than both part-power couples and low-power 
couples, although the Wald test shows that the difference between the coefficients on power couples and 
                                                 
9 Full regression results are provided in appendix D for the preferred specifications – the regressions presented in 
column B, table 2 and column B, table 3a.  Other regression results are similar.     15
part-power couples is not statistically significant at a 95% confidence level.  Holding all else constant, the 
probability of migration for a power couple is 2.2% higher than the probability of migration for a low-power 
couple.  In column B, we split the part-power couples into those in which the husband is a college graduate 
and those in which the wife is a college graduate.  We find that the migration propensity of power couples is 
indistinguishable from that of part-power couples in which the husband has a college degree, and that the 
migration propensity of low-power couples is indistinguishable from that of part-power couples in which the 
wife has a college degree.  When we ignore joint education specifications and control for the husband’s 
education, we find no statistically significant effect of the wife’s education on the probability of migration 
(column C).  Wald tests on the coefficients confirm that the effects of husband’s and wife’s education on the 
propensity to migrate are statistically different.  These results suggest that it is not the joint education profile 
of a couple that affects migration, but only the husband’s education.  Finally, in column D we find that while 
the probability of migrating is lower for couples living in large MSAs compared to couples living in small 
MSAs, the interaction variables show that there is no differential impact of origin size by education.      
The coefficients on other variables are as expected.  The variables included to capture past behavior 
– whether or not the couple is residing in the home state of at least one spouse, and whether or not the head 
has previously moved for a job – remain constant in size and significance across model specifications.  
Living in the home state of at least one spouse reduces the probability of migrating by 2.2%, while prior 
migrants are 0.4% more likely to migrate compared to couples in which the head has never previously moved 
for a job.   
As noted above, these binary regressions are run simultaneously with a sample selection equation.  
The statistical significance of the variable ρ provides a test of sample selection bias.   In all but column D, we 
can accept the null hypothesis that ρ = 0, that is, that the two equations are independent and controlling for 
sample selection is not providing any further information.     
Tables 3a and 3b present the results from the multinomial logit regressions, which confirm the 
crucial role of husband’s education in migration, especially migration to large MSAs.  These regressions do   16
not control for sample selection because sample selection bias was significant in only one of the binary 
regressions.  For columns A through C then, this omission is unimportant.   
The first regression, presented in column A, again does not distinguish between the two groups of 
part-power couples.   The propensity to migrate to large MSAs is higher for both power and part-power 
couples, compared to low-power couples.  The results for these regressions are presented as relative risk 
ratios, indicating that power couples are 2.8 times more likely to migrate to a large MSA compared to low-
power couples, while part-power couples are 3.4 times more likely.  Column B distinguishes between part-
power couples in which the husband holds a college degree and part-power couples in which the wife holds a 
college degree.  As in the binary regressions, this distinction is important.  Compared to low-power couples, 
both power couples and part-power couples in which the husband has a college degree are more likely to 
migrate to medium MSAs and to large MSAs.  Part-power couples in which the wife holds a college degree 
are indistinguishable from low-power couples in their propensity to migrate to cities of all sizes.  Column C 
considers only the education of each spouse, and not their joint profile.  Again we find that couples in which 
the husband holds a college degree are more likely to migrate to a large MSA.  The estimated effect of a 
wife’s college education on the probability of migrating to a large MSA is negative, although the precision of 
this estimate is low.    
In all three regressions presented in columns A-C, couples living in large MSAs are less likely to 
migrate to small MSAs.  Couples living in midsize MSAs are more likely to migrate to large MSAs (with 
slightly lower levels of significance).  These trends indicate a general reluctance to move to a smaller 
metropolitan area and a general preference for moving to a larger MSA.  The regression results presented in 
column D indicate that the education category of the couple has some impact on this preference for larger 
MSAs.  Couples in which only the wife has a college degree are less likely to migrate from one large MSA to 
another large MSA, and more likely to migrate from a large MSA to a midsize MSA, compared to low-
power couples.  However, the results for column D are questionable.   Not only is sample selection bias an 
issue in this specification, but we also find a violation of the assumption of independence of irrelevant   17
alternatives.  Hausman test results suggest that the omission of the small or medium alternatives alters the 
results for the large alternative.   
We see again the robust significance of the past behavior variables.  Residing in the home state of at 
least one spouse lowers the probability of migration to any sized destination.  Interestingly, having 
previously moved for a job has no discernable effect on the probability of migrating to a medium or large 
MSA, but increases the probability of migrating to a small MSA.  This suggests that we may be capturing 
return migrants.   
Both the binary probit regressions and the multinomial logit regressions show that the probability of 
migration, and the migration to destinations of different sizes, depends not on the number of spouses holding 
a college degree (low-power, part-power, and power) but only on whether the husband holds a college 
degree.   
 
4.2  The Effect of Post-Graduate Degrees and Urban Occupations on Migration 
To link the co-location hypothesis to the education profile of couples we must assume that, for 
couples with college degrees, occupational specialization makes co-location pressure more acute.  But many 
college educated individuals, women especially, are in occupations that are relatively portable and are not 
concentrated in large urban areas - the occupational specialization story is more plausible for an economist 
married to a lawyer than for a high-school teacher married to a nurse.  50% of power couples and 55% of 
power singles lived in large urban areas in 1990.  Economists and lawyers tend to have advanced degrees and 
are relatively concentrated in large areas – 59% of economists and 55% of lawyers lived in large MSAs in 
1990.  In contrast, teachers and nurses are less likely to have advanced degrees and are not concentrated in 
large areas - 33% of teachers and 38% of registered nurses live in large MSAs in 1990 (see appendix C). The 
migration behavior of couples in which both spouses have post-graduate degrees – call these ‘super-power 
couples’ - or both spouses have occupations that are concentrated in large MSAs might be very different 
from the behavior of power couples without advanced degrees or urban occupations.   18
We apply the same regression analyses as above to investigate whether co-location effects can be 
found for couples in which both spouses have occupations that are concentrated in large MSAs or both 
spouses have advanced degrees (tables 4, 5a and 5b).  There are 1778 observations in which at least one 
spouse has an advanced degree.  These include 257 observations in which both spouses have advanced 
degrees, 986 observations in which only the husband has an advanced degree, and 535 observations in which 
only the wife has an advanced degree.  Likewise, there are 3493 observations in which at least one spouse 
has an urban occupation, including 1740 observations in which both spouses have urban occupations, 4716 in 
which only the husband has an urban occupation, and 1282 observations in which only the wife has an urban 
occupation. We first include a measure of the urbanization of occupations – the percent of all individuals in 
the occupation that reside in MSAs greater than 2 million.
10  This variable is added as a continuous variable 
(column E) and as a dichotomous variable (column F) that defines urban occupations as those where at least 
40% of individuals in the occupation live in large MSAs.  This cutoff was chosen to correspond roughly to 
the proportion of all individuals living in large MSAs.  In 1990, approximately 36% of all couples and 43% 
of singles lived in large urban areas.  Urban occupations then are those that are more than proportionately 
located in large MSAs.
11  We create categories to describe ‘urban’ and ‘part-urban’ couples by occupation in 
the same way we describe power and part-power couples by education - controlling for couples in which 
both spouses have urban occupations, where only the husband has an urban occupation and where only the 
wife has an urban occupation.  In columns G and H we add indicators for post-graduate college degrees, 
again creating categories to describe the joint profile of the couple. 
We find few significant effects of urban occupation or advanced education in either the binary or the 
multinomial equations.  Those variables that are significant confirm the importance of the husband’s career 
in migration.  Couples in which only the husband is employed in an urban occupation are more likely to 
migrate than couples in which neither has an urban occupation (table 4, column F).  The multinomial logit 
regression results (tables 5 and 5b) are difficult to interpret.  Couples in which only the husband is employed 
                                                 
10 Rates of occupation urbanization are calculated from the 1990 public use files of the Census (Ruggles and Sobeck, 
1997).  Results are shown in appendix E 
11 The regression results are robust to alternative percentages used to define urban occupations.       19
in an urban occupation are more likely to migrate to a mid-size MSA compared to couples in which  neither 
spouse is employed in an urban occupation, while couples in which only the husband has an advanced degree 
are more likely to migrate to small and large MSAs   Thus even under a more stringent definition of who is 
most affected by occupation specialization we find no evidence that co-location pressure affects migration 
behavior.  The coefficients for college education maintain statistical significance and have similar magnitude 
when we control for the concentration of occupations in large urban areas.  The stability of the college 
education variables after controlling for occupation suggests that in addition to employment opportunities, 
amenities and/or returns to education are pulling college graduates to large MSAs.
12  
 
5.  The Four Processes Underlying the Location Data 
The regression results presented above suggest that the co-location problem facing power couples 
does not manifest itself through differences in their migration behavior.  If co-location pressure lies behind 
the concentration of power couples in large MSAs, it does not operate through couple migration.  In this 
section, we argue that not only is co-location pressure not affecting the migration of power couples, but the 
migration of power couples is not likely to be important in affecting location patterns.   
The observed location trends of power couples may arise through differences by city size in power 
couple migration, power couple formation - either through marriage or increased educational attainment-- 
and/or power couple dissolution (divorce rates).
13  Using the PSID and Census data we examine these 




                                                 
12 This suggestion depends on the assumption that individuals do not change occupations:  the insignificance of the 
urban occupation indicators may be caused by individuals changing occupations following migration so that their 
occupation pre-migration is not indicative of their occupation post-migration.   
13 We ignore the dynamics of employment, although these are likely to differ by education and occupation.  Basker 
(2003)  develops a model of job search and migration that highlights the distinction between highly educated 
individuals, who tend to search first and then migrate, and less educated individuals, who tend to migrate without a job 
and then search.     20
5.1 Migration 
The overall migration patterns of couples and unmarried individuals reported in table 6
 are broadly 
consistent with the predictions of human capital theory.
14  Higher skilled individuals are more mobile than 
lower skilled individuals, power couples are more likely to migrate than are low- and part-power couples, 
and power singles are more likely to migrate than are low-power singles.  The observed patterns are not 
consistent with Mincer’s hypothesis that dual-career couples are less mobile than single-career couples. 
The PSID transition data suggest that the migration of power couples is not the primary explanation 
for the increasing concentration of power couples in large MSAs – the migration patterns of power couples 
are not substantially different from those of power singles or part-power couples in which the husband has a 
college degree.  There is, however, some evidence of a revealed preference for large MSAs among power 
couples.  The average rate of migration of power couples living in large MSAs is lower than the rates of 
those living in medium and small MSAs, although the differences are not statistically significant.  Among 
migrants, power couples are more likely to migrate to medium and large MSAs than to small MSAs.  These 
trends, however, are not limited to power couples and may simply reflect a general preference for large urban 
areas.  For every group considered, migration rates of those in the large areas are lower than the rates of 
those in small areas, and this difference is much larger, and statistically significant, for single power men and 
women.  An unmarried man or woman with a college degree is much more likely to migrate from a small 
MSA than a power couple.  Conditional on migration, single power men and single power women are also 
more likely to migrate to large MSAs than small MSAs, as are part-power couples in which the husband has 
a college degree.  Low-power couples are more likely to migrate to smaller areas than larger and there is no 
statistically significant difference among the destination choices of part-power couples in which the wife has 
a college degree.  The data suggest a revealed preference for large urban areas among college educated 
singles and among all couples in which the husband is college educated.  Again we see the need to 
                                                 
14 Recent immigrants are under-represented in the PSID sample. However the location patterns observed in the Census--
those we are trying to explain--remain when immigrants are excluded from the Census sample.   21
distinguish between the two types of part-power couples:  those in which the husband is college educated and 
those in which the wife is college educated. 
   
5.2  Education by City Size 
The proportion of power couples in large MSAs may have increased simply because individuals 
living in large MSAs have a greater incentive to invest in human capital than those living in small MSAs.
15  
The wage premium that is earned by workers in large urban areas may be a compensating differential to 
offset higher living costs and urban disamenities but must also be due in part to higher productivity of 
workers in MSAs.  Without higher productivity, it is difficult to explain why firms are willing to locate in 
these high-wage areas.  The causes of this higher productivity may lie in the ability of MSAs to attract more 
able workers, or because MSAs create more productive workers by inducing human capital accumulation and 
labor-market matching.   Glaeser and Maré (2001) investigate this question using a variety of data sources 
and argue that the urban wage premium is due to a combination of wage-level effects and wage-growth 
effects.   They find that recent migrants to MSAs do experience real wage gains, but that the wage premium 
is highest for long-term residents of MSAs.  Thus many of the urban wage gains accrue over time as urban 
workers accumulate more human capital and benefit from the better coordination of urban labor markets. 
Table 7, which shows the proportion of high school graduates without college degrees currently 
enrolled in higher education, is consistent with this hypothesis.  These data are from the integrated public use 
samples (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census for 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The IPUMS samples are 1-in-100 national 
random samples of the U.S. population created by the Census Bureau as part of each decennial enumeration 
(Ruggles and Sobeck, 1997).   The individual level records of the IPUMS samples include information on 
age, location, marital status, education and current education enrolment.  The samples also allow the linkage 
of spousal records enabling us to determine the joint profile of married couples.  With a few minor 
exceptions, the probability of being enrolled in education increases with population size for all groups in 
                                                 
15 Glaeser (1999) suggests that urban density may increase interactions with highly skilled role models and 
facilitate coordination, thus increasing the demand for human capital.       
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each year.
16  For example in 1990, among married men with high-school diplomas, 6.3% of those living in 
small MSAs were enrolled in credit courses compared to 9.0% of those living in the largest MSAs, those 
with populations over five million.   
The differences across city size indicate that the formation of power couples and power singles 
through educational attainment is more likely in larger MSAs than in smaller MSAs.  Holding marriage and 
migration constant, an increasing concentration of power couples in large MSAs would occur if the 
proportion of married individuals in large MSAs who are enrolled in credit education is higher than the 
proportion of married individuals in smaller areas enrolled in credit education.  For both married men and 
married women, the gap in enrollment rates between the large and small MSAs grew or remained constant 
between 1980 and 1990, and then fell between 1990 and 2000.   
 
5.3  Marriage and Divorce by City Size 
The relationship between city size and marriage is not straightforward.  Edlund (2005) suggests that 
since large cities attract highly skilled individuals they also attract individuals (i.e., women) who seek to 
marry highly skilled individuals.  Drewianka (2003) argues that marriage rates are affected not by the size of 
the city itself, but by the percentage of the adult population that is single.  The effect is two-fold.  With a 
relatively large single population, the probability of meeting a potential spouse whose quality exceeds a 
specified level in a given period of time is higher because people meet potential matches at a faster rate.  But 
the large pool of potential matches also causes marriage market participants to increase their reservation 
quality level.  Drewianka’s empirical results suggest that the reservation quality effect dominates such that a 
10% increase in the single population lowers the hazard rate for entering marriage between 7% and 10%.  
Gould and Paserman (2003) find a strong negative relationship between women’s marriage rates and the 
inequality of male wages within an urban area.  They argue that higher levels of male wage inequality can 
explain 25% of the decline in marriage rates between 1970 and 1990.  Taken together, these papers suggest a 
                                                 
16 The categories of small, midsize and large MSAs are different for this table than for the rest of the analyses because 
the public use files for 2000 do not identify places with populations less than 400,000.   
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finding similar to that of Robst and McGoldrick (1996) on the relationship between city size and labor 
market success:  it is not the size of the market that is important, but its composition.   
The human capital model of migration suggests a link between migration, city size, and marital 
instability.  Increased labor force attachment of wives makes it more likely that the location preferences of 
spouses will differ which increases marital instability.  This suggests two hypotheses.  First, since power 
couples are more likely to experience co-location problems, they may be more likely to experience marital 
instability than part-power and low-power couples.  Second, since co-location problems are less likely to 
occur in large labor markets, power couples living in small cities may have more marital breakups than those 
living in larger cities.  Co-location problems may affect the location patterns observable in census data by 
increasing the relative stability of marriages in larger employment markets rather than by inducing migration.    
Mincer (1978) notes that expectations of marital instability reduce the incentives for either spouse to 
become a tied-mover or tied-stayer, further amplifying marital instability.  If we allow for expectations of 
marital instability, modeling migration as a response to maximizing net family benefits may be less 
satisfactory than modeling migration as a potentially inefficient bargaining solution to the co-location 
problem; these issues are more fully explored in Lundberg and Pollak (2003).     
The results reported in table 8 suggest that the formation of power and part-power couples through 
marriage is more likely to occur in large urban areas compared to smaller urban areas. Table 8 shows the 
probability that an unmarried individual in year one will be married in year two, conditional on the size of 
the year two location.
17 The probability of marriage decreases by city size for low-power singles, but there is 
no statistically significant difference in marriage rates among power singles of either sex.  That is, power 
singles are just as likely to marry if they live in a large MSA or a small MSA, but low-power singles are 
more likely to marry in a small MSA.   The patterns of assortative mating also suggest that power couples are 
more likely to be created in large MSAs than in small MSAs.  While there is no clear differences in 
assortative mating patterns for women by city size, there is a more distinct relationship between assortative 
                                                 
17 These are higher than might be expected for the total population because individuals in the sample must have been the 
head or spouse of a household at some point during the survey years, but this should not bias the comparison across city 
size.     24
mating patterns and city size for men:  college educated men living in small and midsize MSAs are as likely 
to marry a college educated spouse as a non-college educated spouse, i.e., those that marry are equally likely 
to create a part-power couple as a power couple.  College educated men living in large MSAs, however, are 
more likely to marry college educated women than non-college educated women, i.e., conditional on 
marrying, the probability of creating a power couple from that marriage is greater than 50%.      
Finally, we consider the probability that a couple will divorce by city size.  While the confidence 
intervals on these data are too large to make any definitive statements, the differences in the means shown in 
table 9 suggest that power couples are less likely to divorce than low-power couples.  Furthermore, low-
power couples are more likely to divorce if they live in large metropolitan areas than in small MSAs, 
whereas power couples are more likely to divorce if they live in a small city.  These estimates, while not 
precise, suggest that the stability of power couple marriages may be higher in large MSAs.    
 
6.  The Decline in Power Couple Concentration in 2000 
Finally, we extend the time span of the census-based location analysis of Costa and Khan by using 
data from the 2000 census, data unavailable to Costa and Kahn. Table 10 shows the proportions of power, 
part-power and low-power couples living in large MSAs in each of the four census years (1970, 1980, 1990, 
2000), using the 1990 MSA definitions for all years.   
Since our regression results clearly show that the gender of the college-educated spouse matters for 
migration behavior, we separate part-power couples by which spouse holds a college degree.  The data show 
that the proportions of couples living in large MSAs are lower when the wife is more highly educated than 
when the husband is more highly educated.  The data also show that between 1970 and 1990, the proportion 
of power couples living in large MSAs increased dramatically, as noted by Costa and Kahn.  However, the 
rising trend in concentration did not continue to 2000.  Between 1990 and 2000 the proportion of power 
couples and part-power couples living in large MSAs declined, while the proportion of low-power couples 
living in large MSAs increased.     25
Can either of the two hypotheses put forth to explain the rising concentration of power couples in 
large MSAs also explain the fall?   Trends in women’s labor supply did not reverse during this decade:  labor 
force participation of married women remained steady between 1990 and 2000 and the proportion of women 
in specialized professional occupations increased during the decade.
18  This suggests that the co-location 
pressure facing power couples did not weaken over this decade.  But neither do we see evidence of a 
weakening of the relative attractiveness of large MSAs for the college educated.  The fall in the proportion of 
power couples living in large MSAs was not mimicked in the category of power singles. and the proportions 
of both college educated single men and college educated single women living in large MSAs increased 
modestly between 1990 and 2000 (from 55.1 to 55.5 and from 54.2 to 54.6, respectively).   
 
7. Conclusion 
  Using census data, Costa and Kahn (2000) show that between 1970 and 1990 couples in 
which both spouses were college graduates ("power couples") were increasingly likely to be located 
in the largest metropolitan areas.  Costa and Kahn argued that these changes in location patterns 
were driven by the migration of power couples trying to solve their co-location problem -- a 
plausible-sounding hypothesis to anyone familiar with academic job markets. 
  In this paper we investigate the dynamic processes underlying the changes in location 
patterns found by Costa and Kahn.  Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), 
we find that power couples are not more likely to migrate to the largest metropolitan areas and are 
no less likely than other couples to migrate from such areas once they are there.  The dynamic 
processes that appear to contribute most to the observed trends in location patterns include: (i) the 
                                                 
18 The labor force participation rate of married women, aged 23-55 increased from 43.5% in 1970 to 58.0% in 
1980, 70.8% in 1990, and 70.9% in 2000.   The labor force participation rates for most subgroups -  married 
women with and without young children, married women with and without college education – follow the same 
pattern, with a slight decline in the LFP rates between 1990 and 2000 for most groups (less than 1 percentage 
point fall).   Calculations by authors using the census integrated public use census samples (Ruggles and Sobeck 
1997). 
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migration of power singles to large metropolitan areas, (ii) differences in rates of marriage and 
divorce of men and women with and without college degrees in cities of various sizes, (iii) and 
differences in the likelihood that individuals acquire additional education in cities of various sizes.  
The observed trends in location patterns are primarily due to differences in the rates at which power 
couples form and dissolve in cities of various sizes rather than to the migration of power couples to 
the largest metropolitan areas. 
  Our analysis of the PSID migration data hinges on our analysis of the behavior of part-
power couples.  Unlike Costa and Kahn, who group couples by the number of spouses with a 
college degree -- power, part-power, and low-power couples -- we decompose part-power couples 
into two subcategories: those in which only the husband has a college degree and those in which 
only the wife has a college degree.  We find that couple migration patterns are determined by the 
husband's education profile, not by the couple's joint education profile.  The migration patterns of 
couples in which both spouses have college degrees look like those of part-power couples in which 
only the husband has a college degree.  The migration patterns of part-power couples in which only 
the wife has a college degree look like those of low-power couples. 
  Our conclusion that trends in location patterns are not generated by power couples migrating 
to solve their co-location problem is strengthened by data from the 2000 census.  The 2000 census 
shows a decline in power couple concentration between 1990 and 2000 -- a decline that is difficult 
to reconcile with the co-location hypothesis. 
  The plausible-sounding hypothesis based on academic job markets is misleading because the 
typical power couple is not one PhD married to another PhD, but a high school teacher married to a 
nurse.  These more typical power couples do not need to locate in New York or Los Angeles to   27
solve their co-location problem.  But even when we look at super-power couples we find no support 
for the co-location hypothesis. 
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 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  (F) 
Power: Both spouses have   0.378 0.363  0.396  0.346  0.383 0.199 
      college degrees         (0.060) (0.085)  (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.059) (0.177) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has   0.245 0.249  0.266  0.218  0.254 0.095 
      a college degree  (0.000) (0.080)  (0.078)  (0.073)  (0.053) (0.122) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   -0.018  -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019  -0.020 
 (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.030) 
Origin - Large MSA  -0.165 -0.162  -0.165  -0.163 -0.163  -0.094 
  (0.065) (0.066)  (0.065)  (0.065)  (0.064) (0.058) 
Currently residing in home state   -0.543 -0.542  -0.543  -0.543  -0.531   
      of at least one spouse  (0.040) (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.040)  (0.043)   
Head has previously moved for a  0.092 0.094  0.093  0.092  0.090   
      Job  (0.044) (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.044)   
λ1    -0.511  -0.645    
    (1.129)  (1.114)    
λ2    1.157        
    (1.163)        
λ3     0.389      
     (1.086)      
ρ        0.478  -0.891 
        (0.511)  (0.151) 
Wald test of independent 
equations (ρ=0) 
           Test Statistic:  χ
2(1) 
            Prob > χ








Coefficients and standard errors presented.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.   
Bold coefficients are significant at the 5% confidence level.       29
Table 2–  Binary Model:  Probability of Migration 
 A  B  C  D 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  0.022 0.022    0.026 
          (0.000) (0.000)    (0.010) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has a college degree  0.013      
  (0.000)      
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree   0.020    0.021 
   (0.000)    (0.027) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree    0.001    -0.016 
   (0.786)   (0.126) 
Husband Power2:  Husband has a college degree      0.019   
     (0.000)   
Wife Power2: Wife has a college degree      0.001   
     (0.614)   
Origin - Midsize MSA   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.666) (0.685)  (0.686) (0.697) 
Origin - Large MSA  -0.007 -0.007  -0.007 -0.013 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.015) 
Power*Large MSA       -0.007 
       (0.491) 
Husband Power*Large MSA       -0.002 
       (0.857) 
Wife Power*Large MSA       0.057 
       (0.052) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  -0.022 -0.021  -0.022 -0.044 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for a job  0.004 0.004  0.004 0.008 
  (0.045) (0.047)  (0.049) (0.058) 
ρ* 0.478  0.533  0.511  -0.807 
 (0.511)  (0.376)  (0490)  (0.181) 
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)       
      Power = Half Power  0.054       
      Power = Husband Power    0.707    0.606 
      Power = Wife Power    0.000    0.004 
      Husband Power = Wife Power    0.001    0.005 
      Husband Power2=Wife Power2      0.000   
Wald test of Independent equations (ρ=0)  0.432 0.258  0.395 0.032 
For ease of interpretation, the marginal effects of the variables are presented.  For the dummy variables, this is dy/dx for a discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1.   P>|z| in parentheses.  For ρ, the coefficient is given, with its standard error in parentheses.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
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Table 3a -  Multinomial Logit Model:  Probability of Migrating to (small, medium, large) Destination  
  A B 
 Small  Med  Large  Small  Med  Large 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  1.848 2.597  2.797 1.853 2.603 2.852 
          (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has a college degree 1.191  1.584 3.393      
 (0.397)  (0.009) (0.000)     
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree       1.405  1.751 5.074 
       (0.133)  (0.007) (0.000) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree        0.766  1.287  1.016 
        (0.493) (0.359) (0.973) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   0.670  1.037 1.593  0.673  1.041 1.604 
  (0.027)  (0.807) (0.057)  (0.029)  (0.788) (0.053) 
Origin - Large MSA  0.468  0.769 1.093  0.472  0.773 1.126 
  (0.003)  (0.219) (0.790)  (0.003)  (0.227) (0.721) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  0.267 0.297  0.318 0.270 0.299 0.328 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for a job  1.575  0.970 1.179  1.570  0.969 0.117 
  (0.000)  (0.827) (0.425)  (0.005)  (0.821) (0.448) 
Wald χ
2 875.65  922.80 
Pseudo R2  0.1048  0.1074 
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)  :         
      Power = Half Power  0.0735  0.0148 0.4816     
      Power = Husband Power        0.292  0.082  0.034 
      Power = Wife Power        0.031 0.017 0.039 
      Husband Power = Wife Power        0.150  0.339  0.001 
      Husband Power2=Wife Power2             
Hausman Test for IIA:             
       Excluding Small     0.560  0.933    0.608  0.970 
       Excluding Midsize  0.140    0.501  0.139    0.677 
       Excluding Large  0.917  0.414      0.853  0.402 
The coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios.  For dummy variables, this is the change in the ratio of the probability of migrating to the 
indicated destination size and the probability of not migrating due to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1.     P>|z| in parentheses.  Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
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Table 3b -  Multinomial Logit Model:  Probability of Migrating to (small, medium, large) Destination  
  C D 
  Small Med Large  Small Med Large 
Power: Both spouses have college degree       1.823  2.567  3.063 
              (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has a college degree            
        
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree       1.589 1.654 4.796 
      (0.049) (0.037) (0.000) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree        0.671  0.702  1.382 
      (0.379)  (0.420)  (0.502) 
Husband Power2:  Husband has a college degree  1.594 1.826 4.685     
  (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)     
Wife Power2: Wife has a college degree  1.104  1.401  0.630      
 (0.624)  (0.047)  (0.074)      
Origin - Midsize MSA   0.669  1.039 1.609 0.672  0.650 1.602 
  (0.027)  (0.794) (0.051) (0.029)  (0.095) (0.053) 
Origin - Large MSA  0.465  0.768 1.141 0.504  1.113 1.201 
  (0.003)  (0.219) (0.687) (0.021)  (0.763) (0.663) 
Power*Large  MSA      1.073  1.113  0.697 
      (0.874)  (0.763)  (0.579) 
Husband Power*Large MSA        0.360  1.296  1.197 
      (0.204)  (.524)  (0.713) 
Wife  Power*Large  MSA      1.687  4.585 0.000 
      (0.564)  (0.007) (0.000) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  0.270 0.299 0.327 0.271 0.300 0.328 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for a job  1.571  0.970 1.170 1.559  0.964 1.189 
  (0.000)  (0.827) (0.445) (0.005)  (0.798) (0.400) 
Wald χ
2 914.99  26117 
Pseudo R2  0.1070  0.1095 
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)   :         
      Power = Half Power             
      Power = Husband Power        0.624  0.098  0.144 
      Power = Wife Power        0.038 0.005 0.123 
      Husband Power = Wife Power        0.078  0.075  0.013 
      Husband Power2=Wife Power2  0.234  0.379  0.000     
Hausman  Test  for  IIA:        
       Excluding Small     0.593  0.952    0.657  0.000 
       Excluding Midsize  0.108    0.580  0.247    0.000 
       Excluding Large  0.824  0.359    0.950  0.475   
The coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios.  For dummy variables, this is the change in the ratio of the probability of migrating to the 
indicated destination size and the probability of not migrating due to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1.     P>|z| in parentheses.  Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
 
   32
Table 4 - Binary Model:  Probability of Migration Part II 
 E  F  G  H* 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  0.022 0.020  0.019 0.022 
          (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree 0.020 0.019  0.019 0.020 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree  -0.0002  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (0.956) (0.840)  (0.877) (0.909) 
Percentage of husband occupation in large MSA  0.004       
 (0.661)       
Percentage of wife occupation in large MSA  -0.009       
 (0.514)       
Both spouses have urban occupations    0.004     
   (0.281)     
Only husband has urban occupation    0.005    
   (0.037)    
Only wife has urban occupation    0.005    
    (0.225)    
At least one spouse has advanced degree     0.004   
     (0.251)   
Both spouses have advanced degrees       -0.003 
      (0.653) 
Only husband has advanced degree       0.005 
      (0.266) 
Only wife has advanced degree       0.004 
      (0.537) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.645) (0.629)  (0.718) (0.724) 
Origin - Large MSA  -0.007 -0.006  -0.006 -0.007 
  (0.009) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.008) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  -0.022 -0.021  -0.022 -0.035 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for a job  0.004 0.004  0.004 0.005 
  (0.041) (0.044)  (0.042) (0.047) 
ρ* 0.585  0.631  0.569   
 (0.240)  (0.172)  (0.650)   
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)       
      Power = Half Power  0.785  0.732  0.972  0.758 
      Power = Husband Power  0.0001  0.001  0.002  0.001 
      Power = Wife Power  0.0004  0.002  0.002  0.005 
       
Wald test of Independent equations (ρ=0) 0.067  0.010  0.381   
For ease of interpretation, the marginal effects of the variables are presented.  For the dummy variables, this is dy/dx for a discrete change of dummy 
variable from 0 to 1.   P>|z| in parentheses.  For ρ, the coefficient is given, with its standard error in parentheses.  Standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
Due to convergence problems, the regression in column H is run as a single probit, without correcting for sample selection.   
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Table 5a -  Multinomial Logit Model:  Probability of Migrating to (small, medium, large) Destination Size  
  E F 
 Small  Med  Large  Small  Med  Large 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  1.798 2.574  2.960 1.753 2.441 2.914 
          (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree 1.414  1.758 5.226  1.361  1.629 5.178 
 (0.128)  (0.007) (0.000)  (0.181)  (0.018) (0.000) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree  0.532  1.304  1.034  0.749  1.286  1.016 
 (0.165)  (0.335) (0.944)  (0.461) (0.359) (0.972) 
Percentage of husband occupation in large MSA  0.629  1.469  0.773       
  (0.544)  (0.562) (0.818)     
Percentage of wife occupation in large MSA  6.914  0.232  0.152       
  (0.103)  (0.113) (0.298)     
Both spouses have urban occupations        1.671  0.924  0.980 
        (0.064) (0.751) (0.955) 
Only husband has urban occupation        1.144  1.516  0.881 
       (0.527)  (0.005)  (0.614) 
Only wife has urban occupation        1.409  1.290  0.952 
        (0.324) (0.292) (0.893) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   0.655  1.049  1.637 0.674 1.025  1.613 
  (0.020)  (0.743) (0.046) (0.030) (0.867)  (0.052) 
Origin - Large MSA  0.434  0.779 1.135  0.483  0.787 1.122 
  (0.001)  (0.246) (0.705)  (0.004)  (0.261) (0.730) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  0.276 0.299  0.329 0.270 0.298 0.329 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for job  1.574  0.983 1.171  1.563  0.970 1.170 
  (0.005)  (0.900) (0.440)  (0.005)  (0.825) (0.445) 
Wald χ
2 924.39      939.20     
Pseudo R
2   0.1083      0.1093     
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)  :         
      Power = Husband Power  0.365  0.010 0.041 0.3411 0.074  0.039 
      Power = Wife Power  0.010 0.023  0.038 0.040 0.033 0.037 
      Husband Power = Wife Power  0.043  0.353  0.001  0.162 0.462 0.001 
Hausman Test for IIA:             
       Excluding Small     0.510  0.924    0.474  0.974 
       Excluding Midsize  0.222    0.746  0.184    0.633 
       Excluding Large  0.756  0.292    0.780  0.215   
The coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios.  For dummy variables, this is the change in the ratio of the probability of migrating to the 
indicated destination size and the probability of not migrating due to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1.     P>|z| in parentheses.  Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
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Table 5b - Multinomial Logit Model:  Probability of Migrating to (small, medium, large) Destination Size  
Married Sample  G H 
  Small Med Large  Small Med Large 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  1.505  2.759 2.176 1.520  2.758 2.304 
          (0.111)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.103)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Husband Power:  Only husband has college degree 1.275  1.800 4.511 1.253  1.811 4.400 
 (0.308)  (0.007) (0.000) (0.355)  (0.006) (0.000) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree  0.728  1.301  0.953  0.745  1.280  0.958 
  (0.411) (0.336) (0.920) (0.441) (0.364) (0.929) 
At least one spouse has advanced degree  1.559  0.873  1.715       
  (0.087) (0.545) (0.079)       
Both spouses have advanced degrees        1.459  0.784  0.525 
      (0.506)  (0.638)  (0.523) 
Only husband has advanced degree        1.662  0.831  1.866 
      (0.076)  (0.466)  (0.050) 
Only wife has advanced degree        1.310  1.047  1.625 
      (0.563)  (0.899)  (0.335) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   0.682  1.037  1.636 0.682 1.035  1.626 
  (0.034)  (0.804)  (0.045) (0.034) (0.813)  (0.048) 
Origin - Large MSA  0.487  0.765 1.181 0.486  0.762 1.156 
  (0.005)  (0.210) (0.621) (0.005)  (0.203) (0.667) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  0.273 0.297 0.334 0.274 0.296 0.335 
                 one spouse  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Head has previously moved for job  1.590  0.961 1.202 1.598  0.957 1.200 
  (0.004)  (0.773) (0.371) (0.004)  (0.749) (0.375) 
Wald χ
2  946.12    963.37    
Pseudo R
2    0.1084    0.1088    
Wald Coefficient Tests (Prob>χ
2)   :         
      Power = Husband Power  0.535  0.0585  0.014  0.481 0.072 0.030 
      Power = Wife Power  0.088  0.017  0.111 0.093 0.013  0.087 
      Husband Power = Wife Power  0.187  0.324  0.001  0.221 0.284 0.002 
Hausman  Test  for  IIA:        
       Excluding Small     0.673  0.970    0.706  0.978 
       Excluding Midsize  0.197    0.725  0.148    0.750 
       Excluding Large  0.792  0.322    0.855  0.419   
The coefficients are presented as relative risk ratios.  For dummy variables, this is the change in the ratio of the probability of migrating to the 
indicated destination size and the probability of not migrating due to a discrete change in the variable from 0 to 1.     P>|z| in parentheses.  Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.  Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.      35
 
Table 6 – Migration Patterns, by Household Type 
  Probability of Migrating 
Destination, Conditional on 
Migrating 





Power couple    Lower Upper    Lower Upper 
               Small metropolitan area  7.34  5.06 9.62 23.3  17.0 29.6 
               Midsize metropolitan area  8.01  6.12 9.90 36.4  29.2 43.5 
               Large metropolitan area  6.20  4.86 7.54 40.3  33.0 47.7 
Part-Power couple: Husband has BA           
               Small metropolitan area  5.67  3.79 7.55 20.0  13.2 26.8 
               Midsize metropolitan area  9.61  7.23 11.99 39.3  30.9 47.6 
               Large metropolitan area  4.83  3.45 6.21 40.7  32.3 49.1 
Part-Power couple: Wife has BA           
               Small metropolitan area  4.34  2.31 6.36 25.5  12.6 38.5 
               Midsize metropolitan area  4.24  2.20 6.29 42.6  27.9 57.2 
               Large metropolitan area  3.20  1.70 4.69 31.9  18.1 45.7 
Low-Power couple           
               Small metropolitan area  3.22  2.74 3.71 36.9  32.7 41.2 
               Midsize metropolitan area  4.29  3.70 4.89 37.7  33.5 42.0 
               Large metropolitan area  2.69  2.26 3.11 25.3  21.5 29.2 
         
Single Power men          
               Small metropolitan area  17.43  12.36 22.51  23.7  16.3 31.0 
               Midsize metropolitan area  12.35  9.13 15.56 33.6  25.4 41.8 
               Large metropolitan area  5.66  4.09 7.24 42.7  34.2 51.3 
Single Power women           
               Small metropolitan area  16.85  12.43 21.26  22.2  15.9 28.5 
               Midsize metropolitan area  10.55  8.08 13.02 38.0  30.7 45.4 
               Large metropolitan area  6.24  4.80 7.68 39.8  32.4 47.2 
Single Low-Power men          
               Small metropolitan area  8.14  6.88 9.41 33.2  28.4 37.9 
               Midsize metropolitan area  5.27  4.34 6.20 31.1  26.4 35.7 
               Large metropolitan area  4.65  4.01 5.30 35.8  30.9 40.6 
Single Low-Power women           
               Small metropolitan area  6.32  5.37 7.28 28.0  23.9 32.1 
               Midsize metropolitan area  3.96  3.37 4.54 35.7  31.6 40.1 
               Large metropolitan area  2.59  2.25 2.93 36.3  31.9 40.7 
Annual migration rates from 1970 to 1996 estimated from PSID sample.  The estimates assume that the migration rates for each category remain 
constant for 1970-1996, but when we split the PSID sample into the three decades, we find no significant differences in the migration rates of power 
couples between the 1970s and 1980s nor between the 1970s and 1990s.  Couples include those who are observed married or cohabiting in year one 
and year two. Singles are also limited to those who did not change marital status during the year.  Large metropolitan areas are those with at least 2M 
population, midsize metropolitan areas have populations between 250,000 to 2M, smaller metropolitan areas and counties that are not contained in a 
metropolitan area are included in the final category.  Power couples are those in which both spouses have completed at least four years of college or 
hold college degrees,  part-power couples include only one spouse with a college education, low-power couples are those in which neither spouse has 
a college degree.  Couples are limited to those in which the wife was 23 to 37 years of age and the husband was 25 to 39 years of age.  Singles fall 
into the same age categories.       36
Table 7 – Percent of Population Who Have a High School Diploma but Not a College Degree  
   Who Are Enrolled in Credit Education 
          % Change  % Change
1980 1990  2000  80-90 90-00 
Married Men               
               Non-MSA or MSA fewer than 1M  5.6  6.3  6.6  11.8 5.4 
               MSA population between 1-2M  8.5  8.3  8.9  -2.1 6.6 
               MSA population over 2M  8.2  9.0  8.2  9.8 -8.6 
       
Married Women           
               Non-MSA or MSA  fewer than 1M  5.0  8.0  7.8  58.8 -2.6 
               MSA population between 1-2M  6.8  9.1  8.5  34.1 -6.8 
               MSA population over 2M  7.1  10.0  9.5  40.5 -4.9 
       
Unmarried Men           
               Non-MSA or MSA  fewer than 1M  10.0  9.7  12.2  -2.9 25.4 
               MSA population between 1-2M  12.2  11.4  14.3  -6.3 25.1 
               MSA population over 2M  12.9  13.3  16.1  3.3 20.5 
       
Unmarried Women           
               Non-MSA or MSA  fewer than 1M  11.5  13.9  15.3  21.5 9.7 
               MSA Population between 1-2M  14.6  14.9  16.7  1.8 12.6 
               MSA population over 2M  14.7  16.8  19.1  13.9 13.6 
Calculated by authors using the Census Integrated public use census samples (Ruggles and Sobeck 1997). 
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Table 8 – Marriage Patterns, by Size of Area 
   Probability of Marrying  Conditional on Marrying,  
       % with College educated Spouse 
    95% Confidence Interval    95% Confidence Interval 
   Mean  Lower  Upper  Mean  Lower  Upper 
Unmarred Men with less than BA              
               Small metropolitan area  14.0  12.5 15.5 9.9  6.3 13.6 
               Midsize metropolitan area  12.8  11.5 14.1 7.9  4.8 10.9 
               Large metropolitan area  11.5  10.6 12.4  10.9  8.1 13.8 
Unmarried Men with BA or more            
               Small metropolitan area  14.2  9.9 18.5  48.8  32.8 64.8 
               Midsize metropolitan area  14.0  10.9 17.2  51.4  39.4 63.4 
               Large metropolitan area  12.6  10.5 14.7  61.1  52.7 69.3 
           
Unmarried Women with less than BA            
               Small metropolitan area  11.8  10.6 13.0 7.6  4.6 10.7 
               Midsize metropolitan area  8.6  7.8 9.4  11.8  8.4 15.2 
               Large metropolitan area  7.6  7.1 8.2  11.7  9.1 14.4 
Unmarried Women with BA or more            
               Small metropolitan area  11.4  7.9 15.0  61.0  45.4 76.6 
               Midsize metropolitan area  10.9  8.5 13.3  59.3  48.7 69.9 
               Large metropolitan area  10.8  9.1 12.5  64.1  56.5 71.7 
Annual rates from 1970-1996 PSID Data.  Unmarried individuals are defined as becoming married if they are observed to be legally married or living 
common-law in year two.   
 
 
Table 9 - Probability of Marriage Breakup, by Size of Area 
   Means  95% Confidence Interval
      Lower Upper 
Power Couple       
               Small metropolitan area  1.95  0.75 3.14 
               Midsize metropolitan area  1.60  0.74 2.47 
                Large metropolitan area  1.27  0.65 1.89 
     
Part-Power Couple      
               Small metropolitan area  2.50  1.53 3.47 
               Midsize metropolitan area  2.61  1.62 3.60 
                Large metropolitan area  1.81  1.13 2.49 
     
Low-Power Couple      
               Small metropolitan area  3.14  2.67 3.62 
               Midsize metropolitan area  3.77  3.22 4.32 
                Large metropolitan area  4.01  3.50 4.52 
Annual rates calculated from 1970-1996 PSID.  Couples are defined as having a marriage breakup if they  
are no longer married or cohabiting in the second year.   
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Table 10 – Proportion of Household Groups Living in MSAs Greater Than 2 Million 
  1970 1980  1990  2000 
Power Couple   40.1  43.3  49.7  46.9 
        
Part-Power Couple   37.1  37.3  40.1  38.2 
      Part-Power  - Husband has college degree  38.6  40.1  42.6  41.1 
      Part-Power  - Wife has college degree  35.3  34.9  37.9  37.1 
        
Low Power Couple  31.2  32.3  31.3  33.5 
        
Single power men  51.3  53.4  55.1  55.5 
Single power women  48.5  53.4  54.2  54.6 
        
Single low-power men  38.7  42.3  39.8  40.2 
Single low-power women  39.9  44.2  40.8  41.1 
        
All couples in age range  32.9  35.0  35.7  37.3 
All single men in age range  40.8  45.4  43.2  44.0 
All single women in age range  41.1  46.3  43.9  44.9 
Power couples are those in which both spouses have completed at least four years of college or hold college degrees, part-power couples 
include those couples in which only one spouse has completed at least four years of college or holds a college degree, low-power couples are 
those in which neither spouse has four years of college or a college degree.  Couples are limited to legally married couples residing in the 
same household.  For married couples, the sample is limited to those in which the wife was 23 to 37 years of age and the husband was 25 to 
39 years of age.  Singles fall into the same age categories.   Calculations by authors using the census integrated public use census samples 
(Ruggles and Sobeck 1997). 
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Appendix A – Large MSAs (Population over 2M) 
    1970 1980 1990 2000 
New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-CT-PA 18,071,522 17,412,203 17,953,372 19,451,757
Los Angeles-Anaheim-Riverside, CA  9,980,859 11,497,549 14,531,529  16,036,587
Chicago-Gary-Lake County, IL-IN-WI  7,778,948 7,937,290 8,065,633  8,783,199
San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose, CA  4,754,366 5,367,900 6,253,311  6,873,645
Philadelphia-Wilmington-Trenton, PA-NJ-DE-MD  5,749,093 5,680,509 5,899,345  5,661,399
Detroit-Ann Arbor, MI   4,788,369 4,752,764 4,665,236  5,031,963
Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV  3,040,307 3,250,921 3,923,574  4,739,999
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX  2,351,568 2,930,568 3,885,415  4,909,523
Boston-Lawrence-Salem-Lowell-Brocton, MA-NH-ME-CT  3,709,642 3,662,888 3,783,817  4,440,881
Houston-Galveston-Brazoria, TX  2,169,128 3,099,942 3,711,043  4,493,741
Miami-Fort Lauderdale, FL  1,887,892 2,643,766 3,192,582  3,711,102
Atlanta, GA  1,684,200 2,138,136 2,833,511  3,857,097
Cleveland-Akron-Lorain, OH  2,999,811 2,834,062 2,759,823  2,910,616
Seattle-Tacoma, WA  1,836,949 2,093,285 2,559,164  3,023,741
San Diego, CA  1,357,854 1,861,846 2,498,016  2,820,844
Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN-WI  1,981,951 2,137,133 2,464,124  2,872,109
St. Louis, MO-IL  2,429,376 2,376,968 2,444,099  2,569,029
Baltimore, MD  2,089,438 2,199,497 2,382,172  2,491,254
Pittsburgh-Beaver Valley, PA  2,556,029 2,423,311 2,242,798  2,331,336
Phoenix, AZ  971,228 1,509,175 2,122,101  3,013,696
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL  1,105,553 1,613,600 2,067,959  2,278,169
Denver-Boulder, CO  1,238,273 1,618,461 1,848,319  2,252,103
              
MSAs are defined as ‘large’ if their population is greater than 2M in 1990.   The analyses here uses the MSA definitions, i.e., county components, 
from the  1990 definitions.   
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Appendix B – Variable Means 
   Non-Migrants Migrants  Full  Sample 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Sample Size  21317 638 21955 
        
Education Variables        
     Both spouses have college degree  0.110  0.312  0.223  0.416  0.113  0.316 
     Only one spouse has a college degree  0.151  0.358  0.215  0.411  0.153  0.360 
     Only husband has a college degree  0.089  0.285  0.169  0.375  0.091  0.288 
     Only wife has a college degree  0.062  0.241  0.045  0.208  0.062  0.240 
     At least one spouse has advanced degree  0.079  0.269  0.161  0.368  0.081  0.273 
     Both spouses have advanced degrees  0.012  0.107  0.017  0.130  0.012  0.108 
     Only husband has an advanced degree  0.043  0.203  0.108  0.311  0.045  0.207 
     Only wife has an advanced degree  0.024  0.153  0.036  0.186  0.009  0.096 
      
Occupation Variables        
    Percent of husband's occupation in large MSA 0.348  0.101  0.349  0.114  0.348  0.101 
     Percent of wife's occupation in large MSA  0.316  0.103  0.303  0.109  0.316  0.103 
     Both have urban occupation  0.079  0.270  0.083  0.277  0.079  0.270 
     Only husband in urban occupation  0.213  0.409  0.276  0.448  0.215  0.410 
     Only wife in urban occupation  0.058  0.234  0.069  0.254  0.584  0.234 
      
Size of Origin Variables        
     Origin - Midsize MSA   0.422  0.494  0.475  0.500  0.423  0.494 
     Origin - Large MSA  0.256  0.436  0.208  0.407  0.254  0.435 
        
Propensity to Migrate Variables        
     Either spouse living in home state  0.798  0.401  0.448  0.498  0.788  0.409 
     Head moved previously for a job  0.262  0.440  0.378  0.485  0.265  0.441 
          Con’t      44
 
   Non-Migrants Migrants  Full  Sample 
   Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Labor Force Attachment        
     Number of months duration, husband's job  60.31  59.47  49.03  54.56  59.98  59.36 
     Number of months duration, wife's job  31.05  44.89  15.68  27.73  30.60  44.56 
     Husband unemployed  0.044  0.205  0.050  0.218  0.044  0.205 
          Wife  unemployed  0.029 0.169 0.042 0.201 0.030 0.170 
     Husband not in the labor force  0.021  0.145  0.044  0.205  0.022  0.147 
     Wife not in the labor force  0.332  0.471  0.408  0.492  0.338  0.472 
     Total family income  44200  29206  44706  27866  44214  29167 
Basic Demographics        
     Husband aged 25-29  0.307  0.461  0.422  0.494  0.310  0.463 
     Husband aged 30-34  0.398  0.489  0.364  0.481  0.397  0.489 
      Wife aged 23-27  0.302  0.459  0.386  0.487  0.304  0.460 
     Wife aged 28-32  0.407  0.491  0.384  0.487  0.406  0.491 
     Child aged 0-5 present in household  0.563  0.496  0.539  0.499  0.562  0.496 
     School aged child present in household  0.310  0.462  0.343  0.475  0.311  0.463 
     Home owner  0.656  0.475  0.455  0.498  0.650  0.477 
     Either spouse non-white  0.295  0.456  0.218  0.413  0.292  0.455 
        
Origin MSA Attributes        
     Average growth rate of origin MSA  -0.076  0.124  -0.109  0.126  -0.077  0.124 
     Average housing value in origin MSA  108.74  74.57  120.37  82.27  109.09  74.83 
     Distance to nearest MSA greater than 2M  148.43  170.40  207.28  343.28  150.14  178.07 
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 Appendix C(i) - Effect of Power Status on Probability of Migrating: Testing Sample Selection. 

















  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Power:  Both spouses have college   0.378 0.363 0.396 0.346 0.383 0.199 
        degrees  (0.060) (0.085) (0.076) (0.084) (0.059) (0.177) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has a   0.245 0.249 0.266 0.218 0.254 0.095 
        college degree  (0.000) (0.080) (0.078) (0.073) (0.053) (0.122) 
Origin:  Midsize MSA   -0.018  -0.016 -0.018 -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.030) 
Origin:  Large MSA  -0.165 -0.162 -0.165 -0.163 -0.163 -0.094 
  (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.058) 
Currently residing in home state of at   -0.543 -0.542 -0.543 -0.543 -0.531   
         least one spouse  (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.043)   
Head has previously moved for a job  0.092 0.094 0.093 0.092 0.090   
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)   
MSA growth rate  -0.371 -0.371 -0.372 -0.370 -0.364 -0.570 
  (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.159) (0.155) (0.211) 
House  value  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 
  (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Distance to closest large MSA  0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband aged 25-29  0.192 0.202 0.191 0.199 0.187 0.145 
  (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.062) 
Husband  aged  30-34  0.058 0.046 0.051 0.064 0.051 0.068 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052) (0.040) 
Wife  aged  23-27  0.068 0.108 0.059 0.095 0.059 0.108 
  (0.068) (0.085) (0.072) (0.084) (0.067) (0.064) 
Wife  aged  28-32  0.023 0.031 0.021 0.029 0.021 0.033 
  (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.044) 
Child aged 0-5 present in household  -0.109  -0.102 -0.040 -0.119  -0.050  -0.118 
  (0.049)  (0.226) (0.053) (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.036) 
School  aged  child  present  in  0.039 0.043 0.047 0.030 0.045 0.011 
       household  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.050)  (0.047)  (0.041) 
Home owner  -0.291 -0.269 -0.256 -0.329 -0.257 -0.431 
  (0.041) (0.097) (0.102) (0.076) (0.044) (0.035) 
Number  of  months  duration,    0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 
        husband's job             (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0004)  (0.0003) 
Number of months duration, wife's  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
        job  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Husband  unemployed  0.109 0.101 0.079 0.147 0.082 0.189 
  (0.096) (0.124) (0.121) (0.116) (0.095) (0.073) 
Wife  unemployed  0.036 0.002 0.006 0.065 0.007 0.110 
  (0.102) (0.132) (0.134) (0.117) (0.102) (0.072) 
      Con’t 

















  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Husband not in the labor force  0.280 0.257 0.251 0.314 0.247 0.299 
  (0.097) (0.128) (0.125) (0.115) (0.099) (0.079) 
Wife  not  in  the  labor  force  0.051 0.010 0.044 0.035 0.045 -0.004 
  (0.048) (0.072) (0.050) (0.058) (0.047) (0.044) 
Either of spouses non-white  -0.125  -0.105  -0.133 -0.104 -0.129 -0.027 
  (0.050)  (0.062)  (0.056) (0.061) (0.049) (0.072) 
Total  family  income  9.11E-08  1.11E-07  8.7E-08 1.2E-07 9.4E-08 5.5E-07 
  (6.0E-07) (6.0E-07) (6.0E-07) (6.0E-07) (5.9E-07) (4.6E-07) 
Constant  -1.581 -1.839 -1.729 -1.486 -1.693 -1.348 
  (0.092) (0.400) (0.419) (0.191) (0.096) (0.244) 
λ1    -0.511  -0.645    
    (1.129)  (1.114)    
λ2    1.157      
    (1.163)      
     0.389      
      (1.086)     
ρ        0.478  -0.891 
        (0.511)  (0.152) 
Number  of  Observations  21955 21955 21955 21955 21955 21955 
Wald  Chi2  588.41 590.54  587.3  592.07 438.39 425.23 
Prof  >chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo  R2  0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111     
Log  pseudolikelihood       -12439.5  -9383.87 
Wald test of independent equations 
(ρ=0) 
           Test Statistic:  χ
2(1) 
            Prob > χ







Coefficients and standard errors presented.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.   
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Appendix C(ii) – Effect of Power Status on Probability of Migrating: Testing Sample Selection:   
 Sample Selection Equation Results (Table 1) 

















Reference column in table 1  (B)  (B), (D)  (C)  (E)  (F) 
Power:  Both spouses have college degrees  0.038  0.302 0.155 0.138 0.292 
          (0.051)  (0.056) (0.042) (0.034) (0.046) 
Half Power: Only one spouse has a college degree  0.912 0.224 0.167 0.152 0.211 
  (0.037) (0.044) (0.031) (0.029) (0.036) 
Child aged 0-5 present in household  0.743 0.094 0.521 0.523 0.097 
  (0.330) (0.033) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) 
School aged child present in household  0.072  0.068  0.082 0.083 0.035 
 (0.038)  (0.036)  (0.030) (0.025) (0.028) 
Disabled  0.080 -0.137 -0.019 -0.020 -0.084 
  (0.037) (0.040) (0.031) (0.027) (0.036) 
Wife aged 23-27  0.054  -0.227 -0.078 -0.076 -0.178 
 (0.048)  (0.047) (0.038) (0.031) (0.038) 
Wife  aged  28-32  0.013 -0.068 -0.014 -0.011 -0.066 
  (0.034) (0.041) (0.029) (0.021) (0.031) 
Husband  aged  25-29  0.213 -0.068 -0.017 -0.003 -0.059 
  (0.462) (0.048) (0.037) (0.031) (0.037) 
Husband aged 30-34  -0.055  -0.056  -0.058 -0.053 -0.061 
 (0.033)  (0.041)  (0.029) (0.022) (0.031) 
Husband not in the labor force  -0.182 -0.175 -0.197 0.191 -0.189 
  (0.074) (0.083) (0.064) (0.056) (0.069) 
Husband unemployed  -0.132 -0.212 -0.197 0.197 -0.224 
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.064) (0.038) (0.045) 
Wife not in the labor force  -0.175 0.142 -0.050 0.050 0.078 
  (0.285) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020) (0.025) 
Wife unemployed  -0.183 -0.153 -0.196 -0.196 -0.141 
  (0.061) (0.069) (0.053) (0.044) (0.056) 
Home owner  0.187 0.304 0.270 0.273 0.327 
  (0.029) (0.030) (0.024) (0.021) (0.025) 
Either of spouses non-white  0.021 -0.139 -0.064 -0.071 -0.119 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) 
Constant  0.976 1.497 0.757 0.734 1.255 
  (0.038) (0.043) (0.032) (0.028) (0.034) 
Number  of  Observations  26324 24060 26324 25573 24009 
Wald Chi2   766.44   485.58  857.71  438.39  425.23 
Prof  >chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo  R2  0.076 0.049 0.053     
Coefficients and standard errors presented.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.   
Bold coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.  Sample size for columns E and F are less than the full sample due to 
observations dropped for missing values in main equation. 
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Appendix D - Full Regression Results for preferred specifications. 




Equation  Small Med Large 
Power: Both spouses have college degree  0.385  0.138 0.617 0.956 1.048 
          (0.058)  (0.034) (0.226) (0.171) (0.272) 
Husband Power:  Only husband has college   0.358  0.207  0.340  0.560 1.624 
           degree  (0.061)  (0.036)  (0.226)  (0.206) (0.226) 
Wife Power:  Only wife has college degree  0.025  0.078 -0.267 0.252 0.016 
  (0.090)  (0.044) (0.389) (0.275) (0.471) 
Origin - Midsize MSA   -0.018    -0.396  0.039 0.473 
  (0.044)    (0.181)  (0.148) (0.244) 
Origin - Large MSA  -0158    -0.751  -0.257 0.119 
  (0.064)    (0.255)  (0.213) (0.331) 
Currently residing in home state of at least  -0.525   -1.308  -1.208 -1.116 
                 one spouse  (0.041)   (0.161)  (0.133) (0.200) 
Head has previously moved for a job  0.088   0.451  -0.031  0.156 
  (0.044)   (0.159)  (0.138)  (0.206) 
MSA growth rate  -0358   0.007  -1.581  -0.118 
  (0.155)   (0.602)  (0.512)  (0.765) 
House value  0.0003   -0.001  0.001  -0.0002 
  (0.0003)   (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Distance to closest large MSA  0.0003    0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.0000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Husband aged 25-29  0.198  0.001  0.759  0.176 0.696 
  (0.067)  (0.031)  (0.246)  (0.208) (0.366) 
Husband aged 30-34  0.055  -0.051  0.174 0.099 0.230 
  (0.052)  (0.022)  (0.219) (0.158) (0.297) 
Wife aged 23-27  0.055  -0.078  -0.279  0.447  0.115 
  (0.066)  (0.031)  (0.249)  (0.208)  (0.354) 
Wife aged 28-32  0.018  -0.012 -0.138 0.203 -0.049 
  (0.054)  (0.021) (0.217) (0.168) (0.284) 
Child aged 0-5 present in household  -0.046  0.523 -0.477  -0.186 0.098 
  (0.050)  (0.023) (0.186) (0.156) (0.244) 
School aged child present in household  0.048  0.083  0.311 -0.017 -0.081 
  (0.047)  (0.025)  (0.187) (0.153) (0.258) 
Home owner  -0.254  0.274 -0.549  -0.759 -0.547 
  (0.041)  (0.021) (0.169) (0.133) (0.191) 
Number of months duration, husband's job  0.0001   -0.001  0.002  -0.002 
               (0.0004)   (0.002)  (0001)  (0.002) 
Number of months duration, wife's job  -0.003    -0.014 -0.005 -0.008 
  (0.001)    (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Husband unemployed  0.084  -0.196  0.121 0.166 0.399 
  (0.094)  (0.038)  (0.380) (0.308) (0.376) 
Wife unemployed  0.012  -0.195 -1.089 0.136 0.742 
  (0.099)  (0.044) (0.600) (0.311) (0.366) 
Husband not in the labor force  0.250  -0.190  0.603  0.894  -0.586 
  (0.098)  (0.056)  (0.366)  (0.279)  (0.720) 
            Con’t   49




Equation Small  Med  Large 
Wife not in the labor force  0.035  -0.052  0.126 0.135 -0.258 
  (0.047)  (0.020)  (0.186) (0.156) (0.228) 
Either of spouses non-white  -0.125  -0.069  -0.401  -0.324  0.199 
  (0.050)  (0.024)  (0.206)  (0.162)  (0.229) 
Total family income  8.0E-08   3.9E-06  1.0E-06  1.2E-06 
  (5.9E-07)   (4.2E-06)  (1.3E-06)  (1.7E-06) 
Disabled    -0.020      
    (0.027)      
Constant  -1.704  0.732  -3.002 -3.954 -5.181 
  (0.090)  (0.028)  (0.347) (0.295) (0.432) 
Rho  0.533     
  (0.376)     
Censored Observations  3618     
Uncensored Observations  21955  21955 
Wald chi2(dof)  491.44 (25)  922.8(75) 
        
The coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses.  Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on household identifier.  Bold 
coefficients are significant at the 95% confidence level or higher.    
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Appendix E - Urban/Non-Urban Occupations 
URBAN OCCUPATIONS  % Living in large MSAs % with college degree 
Actuaries 0.64  0.88 
Aeronautical and astronautical engineers  0.64  0.75 
Stock and bond salesmen  0.62  0.63 
Podiatrists 0.61  0.99 
Economists 0.59  0.77 
Taxicab drivers and chauffeurs  0.59  0.10 
Mathematicians 0.58  0.76 
Computer systems analysts  0.57  0.68 
Office managers,  nec   0.56  0.65 
Physicists and astronomers  0.55  0.86 
Sociologists 0.55  0.80 
Lawyers 0.55  1.00 
Architects 0.55  0.82 
Parking attendants  0.54  0.04 
Operations researchers and analysts  0.53  0.53 
Sales engineers  0.52  0.62 
Computer programmers  0.52  0.56 
Statisticians 0.52  0.70 
Life and physical scientists, nec  0.50  0.96 
Electrical and electronic engineers  0.50  0.69 
Accountants 0.49  0.64 
Civil engineers  0.49  0.74 
Writers, artists and entertainers  0.48  0.46 
Physicians, medical and osteopathic   0.48  0.99 
Psychologists 0.48  0.93 
Chemists 0.48  0.82 
Financial Officers  0.47  0.50 
Engineers,  nec   0.47  0.69 
Sales managers/department heads, retail trade   0.47  0.50 
Buyers, wholesale and retail trade   0.46  0.28 
Salesmen and sales clerks,  nec  0.46  0.31 
Managers and administrators,  nec   0.46  0.39 
Chemical engineers  0.46  0.84 
Real estate agents and brokers  0.45  0.37 
Biological scientists  0.45  0.89 
Managers and superintendents, building   0.45  0.33 
Dentists 0.44  0.99 
Urban and regional planners  0.44  0.77 
Health practitioners,  nec   0.43  0.81 
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URBAN OCCUPATIONS (Con't)  % Living in large MSAs % with college degree 
Personnel and labor relations workers   0.43  0.39 
Advertising agents and salesmen  0.43  0.40 
Archivists and curators  0.42  0.70 
Mechanical engineers  0.42  0.60 
Geologists 0.41  0.84 
Purchasing agents and buyers,  nec  0.41  0.29 
Computer specialists,  nec   0.41  0.14 
Optometrists 0.41  0.99 
Demonstrators 0.40  0.12 
    
    
NON-URBAN OCCUPATIONS  % Living in large MSAs % with college degree 
Clerical and kindred workers  0.39  0.11 
Clinical laboratory technologists, technicians  0.39  0.43 
Officials of lodges, societies, and unions   0.39  0.47 
Therapists 0.39  0.67 
Health administrators  0.39  0.47 
Hucksters and peddlers  0.39  0.24 
Industrial engineers  0.39  0.53 
Technicians, not health/engineering/science  0.39  0.29 
Protective service workers  0.39  0.15 
Salesmen    0.39  0.19 
Librarians 0.39  0.62 
Private household workers  0.38  0.04 
Social workers  0.38  0.64 
Public administrators, nec  0.38  0.44 
Insurance agents, brokers, and underwriters   0.38  0.38 
Registered nurses  0.38  0.45 
Petroleum engineers  0.37  0.77 
Inspectors, not construction/pubadmin  0.37  0.26 
Engineering and science technicians  0.37  0.21 
Restaurant, cafeteria, and bar managers   0.37  0.09 
Health technologists/technicians, nec  0.37  0.16 
Religious workers,  nec   0.37  0.56 
Conductors and motormen, urban rail transit   0.37  0.14 
School administrators, elem and sec   0.37  0.69 
Construction inspectors, pub admin  0.36  0.17 
Sales managers, except retail trade   0.36  0.23 
Judges 0.36  0.68 
Dental hygienists  0.36  0.33 
Pharmacists 0.35  0.88 
Social scientists,  nec   0.35  0.55 
    





NON-URBAN OCCUPATIONS  % Living in large MSAs % with college degree 
Metallurgical and materials engineers  0.34  0.68 
Bus drivers  0.34  0.05 
Teachers, college and university  0.34  0.88 
Air traffic controllers, flight engineers  0.34  0.20 
Atmospheric and space scientists  0.33  0.46 
Teachers, except college and university  0.33  0.79 
Postmasters and mail superintendents  0.33  0.18 
Railroad brakemen  0.33  0.06 
Craftsmen and kindred workers  0.33  0.05 
Service workers    0.32  0.05 
Dietitians 0.32  0.52 
Railroad conductors, Airplane pilots  0.32  0.53 
Recreation workers  0.32  0.28 
Newsboys 0.31  0.08 
Radiology technologists and technicians  0.31  0.13 
Laborers, except farm  0.31  0.04 
Deliverymen and routemen  0.31  0.07 
Health record technologists and technicians  0.30  0.12 
Health service workers  0.30  0.07 
Truck drivers  0.28  0.03 
Operatives, except transport  0.28  0.04 
Veterinarians 0.27  0.98 
Clergymen 0.26  0.74 
Officers, pilots, and pursers; ship   0.26  0.16 
Agricultural scientists  0.25  0.63 
Funeral directors, embalmers  0.23  0.29 
Fork lift and tow motor operatives, motormen  0.23  0.02 
Boatmen and canalmen  0.22  0.07 
No Occupation  0.20  0.21 
Railroad switchmen  0.19  0.04 
Buyers and shippers, farm products   0.17  0.14 
Auctioneers 0.15  0.20 
Mining engineers  0.10  0.62 
Foresters and conservationists  0.09  0.66 
Laborers, natural resources  0.09  0.05 
Service workers, except private household   0.08  0.09 
Figures are calculated from the 1990 public use files of the Census (Ruggles and Sobeck, 1997).   
Urban occupations are defined as those for which at least 40% of individuals in the occupation live 
 in MSAs of at least 2million.   
 
 
 